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ABSTRACT: 
 
Legitimacy is a central phenomenon in the realm of every organised society. Its existence is 
pivotal for the continued existence of structures of governance and political institutions like 
administrations and legal systems. The legitimation of a political system, or any other social 
system, is necessary to keep it alive without the use of force. A wide range of hypotheses 
exists which define legitimacy and try to explain how legitimation is produced by institutions, 
respectively lent by the subjects of institutions. The evaluation of hypotheses touches on 
different disciplines, ranging from economics, sociology and political science to psychology, 
and their various theoretical approaches, from rational choice via cultural theories and 
organisational studies to behavioural sciences. In this, essay I want to give an overview 
about the current academic discourse, concentrating on the most prominent and influential 
works. The paper presents several definitions of what legitimacy entails and how systems and 
institutions gain legitimacy. Following this review of the academic discourse this essay 
evaluates the working hypotheses against the backdrop of a particularly interesting empirical 
case: The case of the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRI), the local government system in India. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Legitimacy is a central phenomenon in the realm of every organised society. Its 
existence is pivotal for the continued existence of structures of governance and 
political institutions like administrations and legal systems. The legitimation of a 
political system, or any other social system, is necessary to keep it alive without the 
use of force. To some extent legitimacy is even a way of reducing the “cost” of 
institutions by taking away the necessity of coercion by force. A wide range of 
hypotheses exists which define legitimacy and try to explain how legitimation is 
produced by institutions, respectively lent by the subjects of institutions. The 
evaluation of hypotheses touches on different disciplines, ranging from economics, 
sociology and political science to psychology, and their various theoretical 
approaches, from rational choice via cultural theories and organisational studies to 
behavioural sciences. In this, rather theoretical, working paper I want to give an 
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Institute Heidelberg. He holds a BA in Political Science from Uppsala University and a MA 
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overview about the current academic discourse, concentrating on the most prominent 
and influential works. I present several definitions of what leads to legitimacy and 
how the legitimation of systems and institutions comes to pass. Therefore I will look 
at the explanations rational choice theory provides, the common way organisational 
studies deal with the problem and how psychology and behavioural science analyse 
legitimacy and legitimation. While incorporating the seminal works from Martin 
Lipset (1959), John Dowling and Jeffrey Pfeffer (1975), Stephen Weatherford 
(1992) and Mark Suchman (1995), I will also have a close look to recent works 
(Buchanan 2002; Gibson 2005, Tyler 2006, Scott 2008) and the occasional 
“outsider” (Grafenstein 1981). After presenting a comprehensive overview of the 
various hypotheses I will draw from their surrounding theories ways of possible 
measurement of legitimacy. To provide a comprehensive overview over concepts of 
legitimacy and legitimation is crucial for this paper. Concepts and definitions of 
legitimacy, mechanisms and processes of legitimation and their measurements are at 
the core of my research and are also the main object of interest in this paper. My aim 
is critically review the existing literature on the topic. The first research question for 
this working paper would be: 
 
What explanations and concepts does the established research literature offer 
on the topics of legitimacy and legitimation? 
 
Following this review of the academic discourse I attempt to de-construct the 
presented hypotheses against the backdrop of a particularly interesting empirical 
case: The case of the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRI), the local government system 
in India. The PRI present a fascinating puzzle in the realm of political institutions: 
They are a firm part of the Indian institutional landscape and barely questioned in 
their appearance, let alone in their existence. Nevertheless they are a relatively new2 
institution and ridden with corruption, partisan politics and a severe lack of efficacy 
in some cases, but successful in others. I want to explore how the current hypotheses 
about legitimacy and legitimation deal with this phenomenon and if and how they 
are able to solve this puzzle.  My research question here is: 
 
Are the various approaches on legitimacy and legitimation able to explain the 
phenomenon of apparent legitimacy in the Panchayati Raj Institutions? 
 
To investigate the question I will use various surveys on trust, perception and 
performance of PRI in India which were conducted during the last decade. I also will 
use voters’ turn-outs in local elections all over India during the last years. These data 
are not particularly concerned with legitimacy and can only serve as indicators for 
the presence of legitimacy. Since this is a working paper and the related research is a 
work in progress I am not yet able to present any specific data. However, the existing 
data is sufficient enough to at least illuminate the puzzle. Further, the PRI is just an 
interesting case for the investigation of the phenomenon of legitimacy and 
legitimation and not the main interest of the research in general. I do not want to 
analyse the PRS as such, nor do I claim any explanatory value of my research in 
regard to any aspect of the PRI except for the particular puzzle on legitimacy! 
 
 
LEGITIMACY AND LEGITIMATION – PROCESSES AND PROPERTIES 
 
In this part I want to provide various definitions of legitimacy as well as examine the 
components that constitute legitimacy and the processes that are necessary and 
                                                        
2 In their current form they exist since 1993 (constitutional amendment in 1992). 
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included in legitimation. I will examine the different approaches with increasing 
relevance to the field of political institutions, but will start with two main theorists in 
particular which are Max Weber and Martin Lipset. 
 
I start with Max Weber and his idea of legitimacy and legitimation. He 
roughly defines legitimation of a social order as: 
 
“[...] action […] approximately or on the average orientated to certain 
determinate 'maxims' or 'rules'.” (Weber 1978 [1924]: 31).  
 
The result of such action can be placed in one of three categories of 
legitimacy, according to Weber: Tradition, that is the authority of a canon of values, 
beliefs and social norms which constructs a past reality on which the dominated and 
dominating can invoke together; charisma, that is the authority of  ability to lead and/ 
or appearance of strength or wisdom (of a person or an institution); and at last 
legality/ rationality, that is the authority of legal status of decisions, rules and 
institutions and the rational functionality of them, respectively the legal and effective 
(bureaucratic) imposition of rules and decisions (Weber 1978 [1924]: pp. 78; see 
also Tholen 2004 and Tyler 2006). We have to understand these varieties of 
legitimacy as a hierarchy in which the last form, the legal and (bureaucratic) rational 
form, is the prevailing form in modern societies. In other words, in modern societies 
institutions are legitimated by the rule of law; the imposition of rules and decisions is 
accepted by virtue of their legal status (Weber 1978 [1924]: pp. 78). All three 
categories of legitimacy have a process in common which makes legitimation of 
institutions and rules possible: The internalisation of the social norms and values 
which are prevalent in a society. The internalisation of values and norms is the 
process of replacing the external pressure to comply, normally by force, with internal 
conviction that compliance is a self-interest and the norms and values are part of the 
individuals own maxims (Tyler 2006: 378). Tyler puts it: 
 
“People who internalize social norms and values become self-regulating, 
taking on the obligations and responsibilities associated with the norms and 
values as aspects of their own motivations.” (ibid.). 
 
The internalisation of norms and values also includes the aspect of obligation, 
which leads to the voluntary deference to the rules and decisions of a legitimated 
institution. The congruence of the institution with the social norms and values, which 
are generalised by virtue of internalisation of the individuals constituting the society, 
leads to the acceptance of the institution and its decisions as legitimated and prevents 
resistance. Coming back to the three categories, we can see that the compliance in all 
of Weber's varieties is easily explained by the internalisation of social norms of 
values. An institution can invoke tradition as the legitimating factor for a decision, it 
can use the charismatic aspect and it can act rational and legal. In the first case the 
institutions imposition is legitimated by virtue of traditional congruence: It is custom 
to do as I am told, so I will do as I am told. The internalisation of beliefs, customs 
and values has lead to the acceptance of the decision, because it is in accord with 
what the individual beliefs is right and always was right. In the second case the 
concept is the ability to lead and/ or wisdom of the charismatic authority which 
compels the individual to obey; from the individuals point of view the institutions 
decision must right, because the institution has, or seems to have, proven its ability 
to make acceptable decisions. In the third case, which is the case, which marks 
modern societies according to Weber, the virtue of the legality and rationality 
produces compliance. The individual obeys, because the decision is in accordance 
with the law, which has been internalised as the framework of acceptable action, and 
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the decision is, or seems to be, rational and efficient, a value/ norm of modernity. 
However, we have to be cautious when using the term rationality in this case. I 
would not ascribe the same meaning of modern-day rationality, as used in rational-
choice theory, to the term in this connection. It is more a value, which expresses 
modernity vis-a-vis tradition. The emphasis lies on the contrast of traditional values, 
beliefs and customs against modern ideas of the rule of law (legality) and 
efficiency.3 
 
Although that may seem somehow odd, I would describe this internalisation of 
norms, leading to legitimation of institutions, as a reversed categorical imperative. 
The categorical imperative states that the maxim of one’s own action should be in 
such a fashion that could be applied to be a general law (see Kant 1781). The 
reversed argument would be that the general law should be applied as the maxim of 
one owns action. However, the critical problem would be the enlightened application 
of Kant's categorical imperative by a person in contrast to the unconscious 
internalisation of the social construct of norms and values. Weber's definition of 
legitimacy and legitimation has been, and are still, highly influential in the realm of 
legitimacy theory. The normative, value-oriented way of looking at legitimacy and 
legitimation is taken up especially by organisational studies and the psychological 
approaches.  
 
Lipset deals extensively with legitimacy and legitimation in situation of 
structural change or crisis, while exploring systems, which continued to remain 
stable (1959: pp. 88). Although not giving a distinct definition, he describes 
legitimacy as the capacity of a political system to bring society to the belief that its 
institutions are the most desirable and appropriate ones, and to maintain this belief 
(1959: 86). He does identify sources of legitimacy and continuity in legitimation in 
societies which transform themselves from feudal structures, absolutism and 
oligarchy into democratic forms of government and which do so in a, more or less, 
orderly fashion. However, in contrast to Weber, Lipset separates effectiveness4 and 
legitimacy, although both aspects complement each other when it comes to the 
stability of political systems (1959: 86). One of his main arguments is that new 
structures, e.g. new democratic institutions, profit from already existing institutions 
in the process of legitimation. He argues further, that such institutions are primarily 
conservative and integrative in nature (ibid.: 88). The idea behind that is that new 
institutions are brought into congruence with already legitimated institutions, which 
are in turn in congruence with the internalised values and norms of society. By virtue 
of their congruence, the right for obedience (French and Raven 1959 cited in Tyler 
2006: 377; Tyler 2006: 379) is transferred to these new institutions. A very 
illuminating example presented by Lipset for this argument is the transformation of 
countries from oligarchies into democracies: Countries which kept their monarchies 
and integrated them in their new constitutional systems remained more stable than 
countries which abolished their monarchies and turned to democracy (Lipset 1959: 
pp. 88). He exemplifies that with the monarchies of Scandinavia and the United 
Kingdom in contrast to countries like France or Germany (ibid.). The monarchy with 
its integrative and symbolic values is a typical conservative institution which, if 
legitimated, can, through integration into the new structures, share its legitimacy 
with new (democratic) institutions. Lipset also sees the conservative aspect of the 
monarchy as a factor integrating former elites, which would retain their loyalty to the 
                                                        
3 In the temporal context of Weber I assume that the contemporary belief in progress, social 
and technical, coined the understanding of rationality. The word Technikgläubigkeit (belief in 
technology) comes to mind in this context. 
4 Effectiveness being a subcategory of rational and legal legitimacy in Weber’s work. 
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legitimated institution of the monarchy, while this institution is co-opted by the new 
democratic institutions (Lipset 1959: 88). Problematically, Lipset's definition of 
legitimacy (see p. 2) is very short and does not imply much information about how 
institutions gain legitimation in the first place, i.e. how the monarchy became a 
legitimated institution to begin with. 
 
Dowling and Pfeffer, working in the field of organisational studies, see the 
process of legitimation as an active process, initiated by the organisations or 
institutions themselves5 (1975: 127). In the very beginning of their paper 
Organizational Legitimacy, They see congruence between an organisation’s social 
values, implicit by their association and activities, and the “norms of acceptable 
behaviour” in society as legitimacy (1975: 122).  They differentiate between the 
process of legitimation and the outcome of legitimacy (ibid. 125), the first being the 
attempts of the organisation to attain the latter. Following their own definition of 
legitimacy, that is the congruence of the organisation's values, its actions, with the 
prevalent norms and the socially acceptable behaviour (see p. 2), Dowling and 
Pfeffer see the organisation in need to have an output which society can identify as 
appropriate and conform with their own internalised norms and values, or the 
organisation must through communication give the impression of identification with 
those mentioned values and norms (1975: 127). They also identify a third way of 
attaining legitimacy: The organisation can try, through communication with society, 
to change the norms and values of said society and bring these norms and values in 
congruence with their own output (ibid.). That would basically mean they have to 
adjust the connotation of legitimacy in society itself. But Dowling and Pfeffer put 
this third way of legitimation in perspective by stating that this would be a very 
difficult and unlikely process and they see the first two possibilities as more likely 
(ibid.). However, seeing legitimacy as a behavioural constraint on organisations, 
them having to act within the realm of the socially acceptable behaviour, Dowling 
and Pfeffer hypothesise that organisation will tend to alter social norms and values 
nevertheless (1975: 131). We have to keep in mind, however, that they write about 
organisational legitimacy in the corporate and enterprises sector, making their 
observations and hypotheses aimed at private institutions and not directly at political 
institutions. On the other hand it is valid to look at these hypotheses for we can 
educe ideas to the application on political institutions.  
 
Based on Dowling's and Pfeffer's second argument (see above) Meyer and 
Rowan see institutional isomorphism6 as an effective way to attain legitimation. 
Following their definition of legitimacy: 
 
“We take the view that organizational legitimacy refers to the degree of 
cultural support for an organization – the extent to which the array of 
established cultural accounts provide explanations for its existence, 
functioning, and jurisdiction, and lack or deny alternatives […] In such a[n] 
instance, legitimacy mainly refers to the adequacy of an organization as 
theory. A completely legitimate organization would be one about which no 
question could be raised. […] Perfect legitimation is perfect theory, complete 
                                                        
5 Organisational studies as a part of the wide field of the New Institutionalism has a 
definition problem: on the one hand organisation and institution are used synonymously, on 
the other hand institutions can constitute organisations; see Scott 2008 and Hudson 2011. 
6 Isomorphism is a concept, developed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), which states that 
organisation will mimic other, already legitimated, organisations or elements thereof in order 
to gain legitimation for themselves. 
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and confronted by no alternatives.” (Meyer and Rowan, cited in Deephouse 
and Suchman 2008: pp. 50). 
 
The organisations will seek conformity with already established and 
legitimated organisations and institutions, thus producing legitimacy through 
external factors rather than by virtue of being efficient (Meyer and Rowan 1991: 49). 
Further they argue that the incorporation of legitimated institutions and the creation 
of the formal structure of the organisation from these institutions, respectively the 
designing of the organisation in such a fashion that it “adheres to the prescribed 
myths in an institutional environment” (Meyer and Rowan 1991: 50), demonstrates 
the organisation acts in congruence with social norms and “purposes” (ibid.). While 
this argument may sound similar to the idea that organisational output, which is 
socially and normatively acceptable, is the legitimating factor, it is in fact the idea 
that the formal structure is socially and normatively acceptable. Hence the conduct 
of the organisation seems to have legitimacy. When it comes to private institutions, 
such as business organisations or even non-profit organisations, this idea may sound 
plausible. But in terms of political institutions, which are often independent from 
other institutions and are less adaptive7, the isomorphism argument is hardly 
applicable. Especially since Meyer and Rowan explicitly state that the organisation's 
legitimacy is increased in highly elaborated state structures, i.e. environments with 
highly legitimated political institutions (Meyer and Rowan 1991: 53). However, 
Meyer and Rowan argue that relational networks encourage the development of 
structures for the purpose of coordination and control, and societal relations and 
organisational elites create a highly institutionalised context. This is the environment 
to which the organisations adapt (ibid.: 54). An important factor in the 
institutionalisation of the context and subsequent legitimation of the organisations 
play so called rational institutional myths. These myths basically assume rationality 
in certain (state-) structures based an efficiency and expertise. Like already stated 
above, the formal adaptation to these structures promulgate the appearance of 
rationality of an organisation, thus legitimating the organisation (Meyer and Rowan 
1991: 48). 
 
Scott establishes a model which sees the phenomenon of legitimacy resting on 
three pillars, which can be theoretically distinctive: A regulative pillar, a normative 
pillar and a cultural-cognitive pillar (Scott 2008: pp.51; 59). The regular pillar 
emphasises the congruence between an organisation and its output with the laws and 
regulations of a society (third type of legitimacy in Weber 1978 [1924]). The 
normative pillar establishes legitimacy on the ground of morality, which is the 
congruence of the organisation with the social norms and values. The third pillar, the 
cultural-cognitive, describes the conformity of an organisational outfit with an inter-
subjective reality or frame of reference. The distinction of the second and third pillar 
seems somehow fuzzy, since norms and values are deeply integrated in the frame of 
reference and the inter-subjective reality is made up from commonly shared norms 
and values8. There is also a hierarchy to the three pillars ranging from the regulative 
pillar as the weakest way of legitimation to the cultural-cognitive pillar as the 
strongest. An organisation which legitimacy rests firmly on the third pillar can exist 
unopposed since it is taken for granted, that means its existence is so deeply 
integrated into the inter-subjective reality that it is unquestioned. Scott further argues 
that, although theoretically distinctive, in reality various combinations are 
observable, with a strong alignment of all pillars increasing and strengthening the 
                                                        
7 A bureaucracy cannot simply incorporate aspects of legitimated organisation from the 
private sector. 
8 For an more elaborate critique see Senge 2006: 35-47.  
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base of legitimacy (Scott 2008: 62). Scott's model is applicable on political 
institutions since it, in contrast to Meyer and Rowan, does not presuppose highly 
institutionalised contexts and rational myths to work.  
 
Suchman gives probably the most influential definition of legitimacy in the 
organisational studies: 
 
“Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an 
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
systems of norms, values, beliefs and definitions.” (Suchman 1995: 574). 
 
He, providing a very comprehensive evaluation of the discourse, establishes, 
like Scott, three categories of legitimacy in organisations, which are, similar but not 
identical to Scott's categories9, pragmatic legitimacy, moral legitimacy and cognitive 
legitimacy (Suchman 1995: 577).  
 
The pragmatic legitimacy is, unlike the regulative pillar in Scott's model, a 
very basic form of legitimacy, resting on the rational expectations of organisation's 
subjects. It makes efficiency and utility the main legitimating factors. Suchman puts 
it that way: 
 
“[...] pragmatic legitimacy boils down to a sort of exchange legitimacy – 
support for an organizational policy based on that policy's expected value to a 
particular set of constituents.” (Suchman 1995: 578). 
 
Further he presents a related form of legitimacy, influence legitimacy, which 
puts emphasis on the incorporation of subjects in the organisation's structure, thus 
invoking an appearance of responsiveness. Not the direct efficiency of the output is 
the main legitimating factor, but the co-optation of the subjects and the appearance 
of responsiveness towards the constituents (ibid.). 
 
The moral legitimacy is very similar to Scott's normative pillar. Congruence 
with social norms and values, the moral grounds of an organisation's structure, 
procedures and output are the legitimating factors here (ibid.: 579). The third type of 
legitimacy Suchman describes, the cognitive legitimacy, is a type of legitimacy 
which is, like in Scott's pillar-model, based on the taken-for-grantedness of the 
organisation (1995: pp. 582). Cognitive legitimacy is basically the absence of 
questioning of an organisation, because it is perceived as inevitable (see Jepperson 
1991 and Powell 1991).  While Suchman criticises this type of legitimacy as beyond 
the realm of management and private organisations (ibid.: 583), the main scope of 
organisational studies, it is an interesting concept when it comes to political 
institutions, the inevitability of monarchy for example. 
 
The main problem of the organisational studies is their focus on private 
organisations and management studies. Why do I include organisational studies then 
in my review? While not accommodating political institutions explicitly, a lot of 
approaches made by the organisational studies hold some interesting ideas. Further 
Suchman's definition (see p. 2) of legitimacy is widely acknowledged and universal 
enough to be applied to political institutions. In terms of concepts of legitimation 
ideas like regulative and pragmatic legitimacy are compelling concepts in connection 
with political institutions and the idea of (cultural-) cognitive legitimacy can have 
some value when it comes to bureaucratic institutions. On the other hand the lack of 
                                                        
9 Both published their seminal works first in 1995. 
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theoretical and empirical work on political institutions makes an evaluation in this 
field difficult. I can only try to apply ideas, meant for private and business 
organisations, to political institutions. 
 
Further the lack of cohesiveness of definitions and the sometimes very 
confuse nature of definitions of institutions in the New Institutionalism make a 
comprehensive use of the concepts and hypotheses of organisational studies, which 
mainly work within the frame of  New Institutionalism, very difficult (see Hudson 
2011).  
 
Now I will jump from organisational studies to psychology-based hypotheses 
about legitimacy and legitimation. The psychological account of legitimacy is 
explicitly applicable on political institutions, i.e. governance. Subsequently a 
definition from the field shows much more relation to political institutions than 
definitions from organisational studies: 
 
“Legitimacy derives from beliefs citizens hold about the normative 
appropriateness of government structures, officials, and processes. Of central 
importance is the belief that rules and regulations are entitled to be obeyed by 
virtue of who made the decision or how it was made.” (Levi, Sacks and Tyler 
2009: 354) 
 
And further: 
 
“A major effect of legitimacy is an increased likelihood of compliance with 
governmental rules and regulations.” (ibid.). 
 
While psychological hypotheses still employ the Weberian accounts of 
morality, charisma and rationality/ legality (see p. 5) they add a new dimension of 
legitimation. This new dimension is procedural fairness that is the perceived (or even 
actual) fairness with which a decision of an institution is considered and imposed 
(see Thibaut and Walker 1975 cited in Tyler 2006: 378; Tyler 2001). 
 
The attention on the concept of fairness in decision making (Tyler 2006: 379) 
is also reflected in other definitions of legitimacy in psychology-based approaches. 
Hence we could extent French and Raven's definition to: 
 
“[legitimacy is] social influence induced by feelings of 'should', 'ought to', or 
'has the right to' [and the feeling of 'being fair'” (French and Raven 1959 cited 
in Tyler 2006: 377; Tyler 2006: 379). 
 
The idea of procedural justice and fairness as core elements of legitimation 
and subsequently as parts of a definition of legitimacy are important factors at the 
convergence point of psychology, law studies and political science. Tyler 
consequentially argues (defining a loss of legitimacy): 
 
“[...] political authorities and institutions lose legitimacy when they do not 
adhere to procedural fairness norms.” (Tyler 2006: 382).  
 
The effect here is that subjects of an institution which imposes a decision are 
more likely to acquiesce to a decision when they think that the outcome affects 
everyone in the same way, meaning that no one has an unjustified advantage or 
disadvantage over the other subjects. By that logic institutions which adhere to 
standards of procedural fairness, which has a legitimating effect on them, are more 
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likely to acquire obedience by the subjects, even if the decision is unpopular (Tyler 
2006: 381; Gibson et al.: 2005). Further procedural justice and fairness can produce 
an appearance of rationality (Weber's third type of legitimacy; see p. 5) by virtue of 
being ostensibly neutral (Tyler 2006: 384). Another important factor of the aspect of 
procedural fairness in political institutions is participation and representation. As 
argued by Levi, Sacks and Tyler, influence, via participation and/ or representation, 
enhances the sense of ownership and the perception of fair and just procedures 
(2009: 360). Further research by Levi et al. suggests also a great influence of trust as 
a legitimating factor: A political institution becomes trustworthy when it 
promulgates good governance (2009: 356). Political institutions which serve the 
needs of their subjects, imposing policies which benefit the citizens and are generally 
trying to live up to the citizens needs, can gain the trust of the citizens and can 
therefore be legitimated. Levi et al. consider trust, together with procedural fairness, 
as a requirement of value-based legitimacy (ibid.). While basically identical in its 
output, the willingness to obey and sense of obligation, their value-based legitimacy 
forgoes the moral aspect, which is the congruence with social norms and values. 
Further, Levi et al. distinguish between the value-based legitimacy and behavioural 
legitimacy (ibid.: 357). Behavioural legitimacy is simply the compliance with 
decisions imposed by legitimated institutions. Interestingly, the legitimating factors 
of value-based legitimacy have a strong rational notion: An institution which 
delivers can be trusted and legitimated, because it fulfils the preferences of the 
citizens. This impression is backed by what Levi et al. describe as government 
performance, administrative competence and enforcement and monitoring of 
regulations and laws (2009: 358). These are indicators of efficiency of a political 
institution in regards to welfare, bureaucratic efficiency and legal security. 
 
The arguments made by the supporters of procedural fairness have a problem: 
They are empirically ambiguous at most. Gibson et al. provide an extensive survey 
based on the hypotheses that the United States Supreme Court is more legitimated 
than the United States Congress by virtue of its perceived procedural fairness and 
strong implication with legality, and that the legitimacy of the institution is mainly 
responsible for the acquiescence of the citizens (Gibson et al. 2005: 189). They 
tested their hypotheses with opposition and support for the case of ballot counting in 
the Bush vs. Gore election (ibid.). While the hypothesis that legitimacy is 
responsible for acquiescence, not very surprisingly, received support from the data, 
the hypothesis that the U.S. Supreme Court is more legitimate than the U.S. 
Congress has received only little support, if any (the difference may be within the 
margins of error; Gibson et al. 2005: pp. 196).  
 
One quote from the actual study is, in my opinion, pretty unmasking: 
 
“When forced to choose between pure experimentation […] and a design 
mandated by theory, we chose theory. This has imposed a price […]. We 
admit that we sacrifice some of the strength of the causal inference […].” 
(Gibson et al. 2005: 198). 
 
This leaves to some degree the impression, that there is no real scientific 
interest, but an urge to 'model' reality after theory, rather than rethinking theory and 
maybe sacrificing assumptions made by theory in order to relate to the empirical 
reality. 
 
From these psychological approaches I will now turn what is probably most 
sensible in regards to political institutions: Political science approaches to legitimacy 
and legitimation.  
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Easton's concept of political support is probably one of the more interesting and 
influential in the field. Easton distinguishes between two forms of support: Specific 
and diffuse support (Easton 1975: 436). Thus he describes specific support as: 
 
“The uniqueness of specific support lies in its relationship to the satisfaction 
that members of a system feel they obtain from perceived outputs and 
performance of the political authorities. This kind of support is object-
specific [...]” (Easton 1975: 437) 
 
And diffuse support as:  
 
“[Diffuse support] consists of a 'reservoir of favourable attitudes or good will 
that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed 
[...]” (ibid.: 444) 
 
The first form, the specific support, is the support lent to a political institution 
or authority10 based on the individual’s evaluation of the perceived outputs and 
performances of said institution (ibid.: 437). He adds that individuals will give 
specific support to an institution when they perceive that their demands were met, or 
in other words, when individuals benefit from the output and performance of an 
institution. Diffuse support is, according to Easton, not directly tied to the evaluation 
of perceived outputs and performances of a political institution. It is more an 
attachment to that institution that may last longer and is harder to erode (ibid.: 445). 
While specific support may be more orientated towards incumbents of an institution, 
diffuse support is more orientated to the arrangement of an institution (ibid.) which 
reflects in the willingness of providing goodwill towards an institution independently 
from the evaluation of its output. The source of diffuse support for Easton lie in the 
socialisation of individuals, the familiarisation to the institution, the experiences 
individuals had with the institution, mostly the positive, and in ideological 
commitments which may be in accordance with the institutional arrangement (ibid.: 
445pp.). Interestingly Easton does not equalise support and legitimacy, rather he 
describes legitimacy, in a very conventional way (see p. 3), as a component of 
diffuse support (Easton 1975: 451). This seems quite odd to me. While Easton 
defines legitimacy as a conviction that it is right and proper to adhere to an 
institution based on one's own moral norms and (social) values, he sees diffuse 
support as a 'reservoir of favourable attitudes and goodwill' towards an institution's 
output, or in other words, a conviction that the output of an institution is proper and 
one should adhere to its decisions. Also, I would argue that both, legitimacy and 
diffuse support, in Easton's definitions stem from socialisation, experience and 
ideology11. Easton develops a concept which seems to me being simply an aspect of 
legitimacy itself.  
 
Buchanan makes an interesting distinction between political legitimacy and 
political authority (see p.  4), assessing a higher value to political authority. While 
still being to some extent in congruence with two basic Weberian accounts, morality 
and legality, he emphasis the role of human rights and the importance of a 
democratic system (Buchanan 2002: 703).  Subsequently he provides a very 
interesting definition of legitimacy: 
 
                                                        
10 Easton talks of political authority rather than institution, but the meaning is basically the 
same. 
11 Easton more or less shows that himself in his chapter on legitimacy (1975: 452). 
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 “[...]a wielder of political power (the monopolistic making, application, and 
enforcement of laws in a territory) is legitimate (i.e., is morally justified in 
wielding political power) if and only if it (a) does a credible job of protecting 
at least the most basic human rights of all those over whom it wields power, 
(b) provides this protection through processes, policies, and actions that 
themselves respect the most basic human rights, and (c) is not a usurper (i.e., 
does not come to wield political power by wrongly deposing a legitimate 
wielder of political power).” (Buchanan 2002: 703). 
 
And one for political authority: 
 
“I shall say that an entity has political authority if and only if, in addition to 
(1) possessing political legitimacy it (2) has the right to be obeyed by those 
who are within the scope of its rules; in other words, if those upon whom it 
attempts to impose rules have an obligation to that entity to obey it.” (ibid.: 
691). 
 
For him the main legitimating factors for political institution, and these are 
basically governments, are their ability, credibility and willingness to protect basic 
human rights. The human rights build the moral justification to rule and impose 
decisions. The other great legitimating factor is the democratic nature of the 
institution. A political institution can only be legitimated if its occupiers came to 
power democratically, respectively, if the institution is democratic in nature (ibid.). 
This conclusion is built on the assumption that where (liberal) democratic structures 
are available, only (liberal) democratic structures can be legitimate (ibid.: 689). The 
focus on liberal values like democracy and human rights makes legitimation a highly 
normative concept. Interestingly, the exclusion of the 'right to be obeyed' from the 
definition of political legitimacy, makes Buchanan's concept a floating concept, 
where it is somehow a moral justification to adhere to a legitimated political 
institution, but not a consequence to obey its decisions. 
 
Rothstein, on the contrary, places legitimation on the output side of the 
political system, describing political legitimacy as rather a result of the quality of a 
government as opposed to the quality of the elections12 which led to the 
establishment of said government (Rothstein 2009: 313). The normative foundation 
of the quality of government, according to Rothstein, is the impartiality of the 
government, that is the ability to decide without consideration of personal interest or 
personal relations, or in other words a government which is free of corruption and 
discrimination (ibid.: 314, 325). If citizens recognise that their government acts to 
protect their citizens’ interests and serve them equally, that is without discrimination 
and without serving the personal interests of the occupants of the regime, they are 
likely to legitimate their government (ibid.). While his argument is much more 
grounded in reality than others, placing the legitimation process at the interface 
between citizens and institutions, it has the problem that in reality governments 
always cater to their own electorates first and that in liberal democratic governments, 
by the very definition of the political system their operating in, have to be 
discriminatory towards minorities13. 
                                                        
12 Rothstein is not disregarding the importance of free and fair elections and its possible 
influence on legitimacy. He is just placing much more importance on the output side (2009: 
pp. 325). 
13 A majoritarian system always discriminates against the preferences of the electoral 
minorities; likewise protection of the preferences of a majority in a society is very likely to 
discriminate against the preferences of at least one minority.  
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A completely different approach to the phenomenon of legitimacy is made by 
Grafenstein. His definition of legitimacy is probably one of the most notable and 
distinctive in this field of research: 
 
“[...] an institution is legitimate when the range of meaningful political choices 
across which an individual calculates, develops attitudes, or reflexively reacts 
is effectively circumscribed by the institution.” (Grafenstein 1989: 61). 
 
Already in 1989 he is criticising the, in his view, false assumption that 
legitimacy rests in the private sphere, that means on the norms and values of the 
subjects. Rather than that he sees legitimacy as a property of the public sphere 
(Grafenstein 1989: pp. 51). In contrast to the, in the discourse widely acknowledged, 
assumption that common morality, values and norms produce public behavioural 
coordination, Grafenstein argues, that they are public behavioural coordination 
(ibid.: 54).  In his criticism he puts it very sharply, but also brightly: 
 
“Consider first the methodological objection that the use of legitimacy to 
explain political obedience tends to become tautological. In the institutional 
view, this is virtually an inevitable result, since behaviour is not a product of a 
psychological state but constitutes what we construe that psychological state 
to be. Specifically, the behaviour that 'measures' legitimacy is ultimately the 
behaviour that defines it.” (Grafenstein 1989: 55). 
 
And further: 
 
“If the behaviour that is chosen to measure legitimacy ultimately defines it, 
then the difference between correctly identifying behavioral indicators of 
legitimacy and arbitrarily equating a set of behavioral indicators with 
legitimacy becomes obscure.” (ibid.). 
 
Grafenstein's conceptualisation of legitimation and legitimacy is rather 
instrumental (see definition p. 4). His game-theoretical approach is intriguing with 
its rational assumptions of utility/ positive pay-off when using legal channels 
provided by the institutions, or in turn, the lack of utility/ negative pay-off when 
using an illegal channel outside the institution (Grafenstein 1989: 61). The idea that 
the legitimacy of a political institution is assured if the individual/ subject of that 
institution has no choice but to use the institutional, legal channels (otherwise he 
would invest more than he could get out of his choice, e.g. punishment) is 
compelling, because of its relative simplicity. Similar ideas are discussed also in the 
rational choice institutionalism, especially the solution of the collective action 
dilemma by channelling decision making through institutional arrangements and by 
that reducing the losses and providing a maximum utility to the subjects of the 
institutional arrangement (see Hall and Taylor 1996; Shepsle 2005). However, 
legitimation does not arise from the constraint of behavioural choices through 
political institutions as such. There are processes involved which shape the 
constraints. 
 
The overall review of the literature on legitimacy, especially legitimacy of 
political institutions, shows that the discourse is mostly concerned with legitimation 
through congruence between internalised norms and values and the socially 
constructed frame. Morality and taken-for-grantedness through cognitive filters are 
the main arguments for the ability of institution to legitimate themselves. 
Organisational studies further emphasises the role of isomorphism, the imitation of 
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legitimated organisation and institutions to gain legitimacy for themselves. 
Psychological approaches add procedural fairness as an important legitimating 
factor. All hypotheses have one thing in common: Institutions can actively seek 
legitimacy and legitimacy can be derived from legitimacy (see the isomorphism 
argument). Although various assumptions are made in regard to rationality, they are 
often integrated in the overall construct of value-based legitimacy (see myths of 
rationality; Meyer and Rowan 1991). All in all the concepts of legitimacy and the 
assumptions on legitimation in most approaches are somehow arbitrary and make the 
impression of ex-post-facto constructions, probably stemming from small cases, 
where these approaches make sense (small inter-subjective communities with 
legitimated institutions make the assumption that the institutions congruence with 
the norms and values of the inter-subjective community legitimate these institutions 
very compelling). Grafenstein's critique follows that impression when he explicitly 
identifies the tautology of an argument which basically says legitimate behavioural is 
identified by compliance and compliance indicates legitimate behaviour leading to 
legitimacy. Grafenstein's approach in contrast, which is pretty much in line with later 
work in rational-choice institutionalism, is more instrumental and seems to be much 
clearer. His assumption of legitimation through institutional constraints, especially 
the point of high negative pay-offs in case of illegal choices, make sense, because 
legitimacy is not constructed from itself, but from instrumental behaviour and 
rational choices. 
 
One major point which all approaches have in common, even the more recent 
ones, is the firm foundation of the concepts in western, industrialised contexts. 
Almost all research in the literature was done in Europe or North America in 
societies, which have all a very similar, often even intertwined, set of historical 
experiences, cultural backgrounds and norms. From a developing country 
perspective this is very problematic. The analyses of political institutions in such 
countries is complicated by the huge differences in the history of institutionalisation, 
i.e. the imposition of governance structures through colonial powers, the sudden 
changes in regimes or occupiers of regimes and the gaps between the cultural 
contexts of the occupiers of regimes and the norms, traditions and values  of the 
institutions' origins. That makes a de-construction of the established research against 
the political institutions of developing countries even more important. The case of 
the PRI in India is an excellent object of investigation in this regards. 
 
 
MEASUREMENTS OF LEGITIMACY 
 
The discussion of operationalisation of the presence of legitimacy via indices and 
valid indicators which are applicable to political institutions is crucial to my 
research. Various ways of to operartionalise legitimacy exist within the academic 
discourse, ranging from structural to individual approaches. They can be aimed at 
the institutions itself or at the behaviour and attitudes of individuals towards the 
institutions. 
 
Stephen Weatherford's work states in this regard clearly the complexity of 
measuring legitimacy and the distinction of two perspectives: The macro 
perspective, investigating the properties of the system and the macro-structures 
(society at large, etc.) and the micro perspective, investigating attitudes and 
behaviour of citizens (1992: 149).  Improving on the conventional model for survey-
based methods he identified, consisting of political components (political trust, 
government responsiveness, etc.) and personal components (political interest, 
political efficacy, personal trust, etc.), Weatherford proposes a revised model, which 
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includes now a 'judgement of system performance' side and a 'personal/ citizenship 
traits' side, with interrelated components (government performance, political 
involvement, interpersonal trust, personal efficacy, etc.) (1992: pp. 154). While his 
revised model has advantages over the conventional model in terms of macro level 
structures and can, in Weatherford's view, align theory and measurement more 
closely, the conventional model keeps its value when it comes to measuring the 
micro level (Weatherford 1992: 159). The revised model has some interesting 
attempts to open the government 'black box'. It should be able, according to 
Weatherford, to measure individuals evaluation of public policies and their ability to 
distinguish between procedures and policies, fairness and efficacy (ibid.: 161). 
Scully, Jones and Trystan argue for election turn outs as an indicator for institutional 
legitimacy (Scully et al. 2004: 521). Although they concede, in line with Pateman 
(1970 cited in Scully et al. 2004: 522), that low election turn outs do not necessarily 
indicate low legitimacy, high turn outs indicate political legitimacy (Scully et al. 
2004: 523). There is, however, a threshold, a minimum turn out to justify elections 
(ibid.: 522; see Pateman 1970). The election turn-out argument seems rather 
compelling, since, intuitively, high participation in elections seems to indicate high 
acceptance. Further the argument is in accord with the argument made by 
Grafenstein. Elections are basically choices made within the legal institutional 
channels, thus the usage of this channel by voting, makes elections a legitimating 
process. Following the argument of Booth and Seligson that legitimacy ultimately 
relies on citizens' perceptions (Booth and Seligson 2009: 8), Doyle uses trust as a 
proxy to indicate legitimacy (2011: pp. 11). He uses a cross-survey analysis on 
confidence in main political institutions (parliaments, political parties, judiciary) to 
infer the level of trust/ distrust in political institutions and to indicate legitimacy 
from that (ibid.). The trust-proxy is an interesting instrument since it is applicable in 
nearly every context where political institutions exist and its measurement can be 
done with a simple, easy-to-understand question.  However, I have to admit that this 
is just a one-dimensional proxy, which cannot encompass all aspects of legitimacy 
mentioned in the theoretical discourse. 
 
Another method of measurement, derived from Grafenstein's definition of 
legitimacy (see p. 4), can be a measurement of the willingness to make illegal 
choices, respectively, choices outside the institutional channels. Such a measure can 
be the willingness of citizens to pay bribes to circumvent institutional channels or to 
abridge institutional processes via an illegal choice. Such measurements of 
corruption are already done in survey, i.e. by Widmalm (2008: 148). The advantage 
of such a measurement, if done by a carefully formulated question, can indicate the 
preparedness of citizens to solely make legal choices by using institutional channels 
or, negatively formulated, their aversion of institutions by their illegal choices. By 
the willingness, respectively, aversion to make legal choices, using institutional 
channels, it is possible to at least infer the condition of legitimacy of a political 
institution. The above mentioned measurements are only an excerpt of a much wider 
discourse, but they represent ways some important dimensions of legitimacy of 
political institutions can be measured. With election turn outs and corruption 
measurement it is possible to infer on the citizens willingness to choose from the set 
of legal actions, rather than from a set of illegal actions, respectively, the willingness 
to use the channels the political institution offers, because they provide a positive 
pay off, in contrast to no, or even a negative pay off when circumventing these 
channels. Following Grafenstein, the institution is legitimated if the citizens see no 
alternative to the use of the institutional channels. Trust, on the other hand, adds a 
perceptive dimension. Having confidence in a political institution indicates that this 
institution is perceived as an appropriate institution. Hence it is suitable as a proxy 
for legitimacy. Again, trust, as apparent in Weatherford's work, is also only one of 
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many dimensions. Weatherford offers additional dimensions of measuring 
legitimacy, for example political and personal efficacy, institutional performance and 
government responsiveness. Political efficacy and institutional performance, at least 
its perceptions, are good indicators for legitimacy, since high degrees efficacy and 
performance usually indicate delivering institutions. From a rational-choice point of 
view a cornerstone of legitimacy. 
 
When it comes to the operationalisation of legitimation mechanisms in value-
oriented approaches, like in DiMaggio and Powell, Scott and Suchman, one has to 
look at the context of the institution under investigation. What the core values, 
beliefs and traditions of a society in question are is the crucial knowledge in this 
regard. Such an investigation must aim at the expressions of the context, like 
iconography, language, symbols, codifications (both, actual laws and normative 
conducts) and belief systems. This can be done by hermeneutic devices, by discourse 
analyses or by ethnographical fieldwork. By the investigation of how institutions 
represent the context's iconography, language, etc. it is possible to identify the 
mechanisms of the legitimation processes. The empirical research in these cases, 
however, is limited to smaller cases, given the fact that qualitative research includes 
a great deal dedicated work (see DiMaggio 1991: pp. 286).  
 
One important point, however, is has to be considered: The distinction 
between concepts and methods must be observed. Trust may be a good proxy in 
measuring legitimacy, but conceptualising trust as a legitimating factor may open a 
tautology trap (see Grafenstein 1989: 55). Further, election turn outs may indicate 
the existence of legitimacy, but low turn outs do not necessarily indicate its absence. 
Here only positive proof is possible. Also the argument concerning trust is valid for 
election turn outs, too. So while a measurement of legitimacy must be aligned to 
theory, concepts and methods must be distinctive from each other. 
 
 
THE PANCHAYATI RAJ SYSTEM AND ITS PUZZLE 
 
For reasons of space I cannot fully engage into a discussion about the structures and 
the history of the PRI in depth, therefore I strongly recommend Goel and Rajneesh 
(2003), Bhattacharyya (2003), Palanithurai (2005) Datta (2006) and Widmalm 
(2008) as further sources of information on the Panchayati Raj System and its 
structure. 
 
The Panchayati Raj System (PRS) and its institutions (PRI) are the result of a 
longer evolution of local government institutions in India. The current form was 
introduced as the 73
rd
 Amendment to the constitution of India in 1992 and 
subsequently ratified into state acts during the years of 1993 to 1996 (Sharma 2005: 
250; Widmalm 2008: 64). The system encompasses participative bodies with limited 
legislation and administrative bodies. The participative bodies are at the grass-roots 
level and are namely ward assemblies and village assemblies. They main duties are 
limited legislation and budget rights in terms of local development of agriculture, 
infrastructure and commerce and the levy of certain fees and taxes, as permitted by 
state law (Sharma 2005: pp. 251; Widmalm 2008: pp. 66). Additionally there is an 
executive committee at the village level, referred to as the village panchayat, which 
is directly elected by the citizens of the village. This village panchayat is the directly 
elected head of administration and employs professional personnel for administrative 
and other purposes (ibid.). Above the village level are the block and the district level 
panchayats which are partly elected by the citizens and partly constituted from ex-
officio members, e.g. members of the legislative assembly from that constituency 
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(ibid.). A range of quotas shall ensure the participation of traditionally marginalised 
groups and minorities (Fürstenberg 2011: 2) While the names of these institutions 
can vary from state to state, and even the duties and privileges can be different under 
the respective state laws, the general outfit is the same all over India: A grass-roots 
level assembly and executive body and partly elected executive institutions at the 
block and district level. Also its directives are basically the same: The PRI are 
expressions of the developmental democracy approach; that means these institutions 
shall enable the citizens to take part on decisions concerning their own 
developmental needs, especially in the above mentioned fields. Further, through the 
quota system, social development should be advanced. Socially marginalised groups 
should be more integrated and able to exercise their democratic rights and profit 
from economic development (see Goel and Rajneesh 2003, Bhattacharyya 2003, 
Palanithurai 2005, Datta 2006 and Widmalm 2008). The results of the Panchayati 
Raj reforms in terms of their official goals can be describes as mixed at best. 
Research has shown that while successes are there, huge problems, such as social 
and political exclusion, corruption, etc., remain. In terms of social development 
Baviskar and Mathew (2009) present a comprehensive edition of field studies from 
all over India, showing the inconsistency of results of PRI. Joshi, for example, 
concludes his field research on Gujarat in Baviskar's and Mathew's edition with the 
remark, that, although some progress is made, most women and Scheduled Castes 
and Tribes remain unaware of the PRI's provisions and are not able to enforce social 
justice for their respective groups. Especially women remain dependent on their 
husbands (Joshi 2009: 431). In the same edition Singh, in his chapter on Rajasthan 
remarks that, even though real empowerment has not arrived yet, marginalised 
communities were able to include themselves into the political power structure 
(Singh 2009: 404). Palanithurai in his work on Tamil Nadu argues in the same line. 
While admitting that marginalised groups were sometimes refused to participate in 
local elections (Palanithurai 2005: pp. 226), he also states school enrolment 
increased through campaigns sponsored by local PRI (ibid. 2005: 240). These 
examples mirror the general impression on gets from the research made during the 
last decade. This inconsistency becomes also very clear in the following description 
of surveys made India, where the mixed outcome of the PRS is nicely shown by 
Widmalm's work on Kerala and Madhya Pradesh (2008). 
 
With regard to legitimacy, empirical research on PRI produces curious results, 
which in my opinion, provide a puzzle. But before I elaborate further, a short 
recourse to a possible measurement of legitimacy: As I already described above (see 
pp. 11) measurements of trust, election turn outs, willingness to make illegal choices, 
efficacy and perception of institutional performance can be used as indicators of 
legitimacy. The argument behind this is that high levels of trust, high election turn 
outs and willingness to only use institutional channels indicate that the institution is 
accepted and its procedures are seen as utile. Since measurements of trust in PRI and 
election turn outs are widely available I will use these indicators to estimate if the 
PRI are legitimated or not. I will then look at other commonly accepted legitimating 
factors (values, efficiency, procedural fairness, etc.: see pp. 5) and evaluate if they 
are applicable in this case. Using survey data from different surveys I will 
concentrate on mainly the village level. Further, I will, in the case of trust, not 
distinguish between the 'quality' of trust, but will take a dichotomous approach, 
where a majority having trust indicates legitimacy. The surveys I use for my purpose 
were conducted during the years of 2001 and 2008 by three different researchers 
(Fürstenberg 2008, Mitra 2001, and Widmalm 2001) and in different states of India. 
Mitra (2001) conducted a nationwide survey on attitudes towards Indian state 
institutions, including the question for trust in various institutions. Widmalm (2001) 
conducted extensive quantitative research on perception, performance and Social 
Capital in Kerala and Madhya Pradesh. My own research on perception and 
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performance, modelled after the afore-mentioned two surveys, was conducted in 
2008 in the district of Burdwan, West Bengal. The wide range over space and time 
of these three surveys, as well as their comparability, allow me to use them. 
However, since they are explicitly designed for the investigation of legitimacy and 
legitimation, they can only serve to illuminate the puzzle, not to solve it. 
 
Using the data from the different surveys in different states of India, the 
following results can be observed: In West Bengal approximately 75% of the 
respondents has trust into the PRI on the village level (Fürstenberg 2010: 9). Another 
survey, measuring only high trust14 showing an average15 of 39.9% of high trust all 
over India with variations of 29.9% in Bihar, 40.7% in Maharashtra and 50.6% in 
West Bengal (Mitra 2001: 111). Asked about the importance16 of village panchayats, 
an indicator which I use with some reservations, another survey showed that 74.8% 
of the respondents attached importance to the institutions in Kerala and 
approximately 68% attached importance to the institutions in Madhya Pradesh 
(survey data from the University of Uppsala 2001; parts of it are published in 
Widmalm 2008). Again, I must stress the ambiguous value of these data in terms of 
measuring legitimacy. In terms of personal efficacy of the PRI combined results of 
the Kerala and Madhya Pradesh survey show, that about 35% of the respondents 
believed their influence on the institutions increased following the 1992 reform, 
while 55% stated it to be the same (Widmalm 2008: 87). A rise in personal efficacy, 
especially a comparatively high rise, is indicating a legitimating process.  To 
measure the political efficacy the Kerala survey asked for the satisfaction of needs17. 
The results show a high perceived efficacy of the institutions with 76.5% of 
respondents believing that their needs are satisfied at least on a low level (survey 
data from the University of Uppsala 2001; parts of it are published in Widmalm 
2008). As the next indicator I use the voters turn out of the last village panchayat 
elections. The numbers are consistently high all over India: 73% in Gujarat, over 
80% in Goa, over 70% in Jammu and Kashmir, about 70% in Orissa and even 
around 60% in one of the poorest performing states in India, in Bihar.18 These high 
numbers indicate a willingness to support the institution through the legal and 
institutional act of voting. Deducing from these data I assume that the PRI, 
especially the village panchayats, can be described as legitimated institutions. I turn 
now to perception of institutional performance and attitudes towards bribes as 
indicators, looking at institutional performance first. In a survey conducted in West 
Bengal only 21.5% (about 64.9% could name one improvement, mostly improved 
maintenance of roads [49.7%]) of respondents could name three improvements in 
infrastructure in their village over the course of 15 years; only 27.8% were able to 
name at least one improvement in agriculture (Fürstenberg 2010: 16). In contrast the 
                                                        
14 The results evaluate only the answering possibility 'a great deal of trust'; the survey also 
asked for 'no trust at all' and 'somewhat'. 
15 Combination of state surveys. 
16 The questionnaire asked for a rating from 0 to 4, 0 being not important at all, 4 being very 
important; 2 is the threshold indicating importance attached to the village panchayat on a low 
level. 
17 Using the same grading system described in footnote 14; grade 2 being the threshold 
again. 
18 In order of naming: http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_high-turnout-at-gujarat-
panchayat-polls-a-sign-of-villagers-zeal_1631587, 
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-05-17/goa/31748539_1_voter-turnout-
lowest-turnout-panchayat-elections, http://www.dayandnightnews.com/2011/06/over-70-
voter-turnout-in-13th-phase-of-jk-panchayat-polls/, 
http://news.outlookindia.com/items.aspx?artid=751821, http://post.jagran.com/Second-phase-
of-Panchayat-polls-in-Bihar-witness-588-percent-turnout-1303666350 all retrieved on June 
13, 2012; all numbers are based on the State Election Commissions numbers. 
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numbers in Kerala are more positive: 76.1% of respondents could name a successful 
project with a broad amplitude of answers (the top four answers include latrines 
[18.3%], water management [17.3%], feeder roads [ca. 14%] and transportation [ca. 
10%]; survey data from the University of Uppsala 2001; parts of it are published in 
Widmalm 2008). The diversification of in the naming of successful projects in 
Kerala in contrast to the focus on one project in West Bengal suggests a higher 
perceived performance in Kerala.  If we now look at the attitudes towards bribes in 
the Kerala and Madhya Pradesh survey we get two interesting results: While the 
number of respondents who would never pay bribes in the medical sector is very low 
(30%), indicating 70% of respondents would be prepared to pay bribes, 67% of the 
same respondents would never pay bribes in the educational sector (Widmalm 2008: 
145). The attitudes towards bribes are more positive in low performing villages, with 
a higher inclination to pay bribes in low performing villages in Madhya Pradesh 
according to the survey (ibid.: 143). The result is interesting, because the attitude 
towards paying bribes is inconsistent and obviously depends on performance of the 
village panchayat, as well as on the field in which the bribes should be paid.  
 
 Although a cross-survey analysis of legitimacy indicators is to some extent 
critical and lacks the consistency of a monolithic survey, I will use the results I 
described before to illustrate the PRI puzzle. First, however, I must clarify two 
things about the PRI: The PRI have, despite variance in names and privileges from 
state to state, the same overall outfit of the institutions all over India. On the other 
hand India is culturally, economically and socially a highly diverse country. So what 
is the puzzle then? The puzzle appears in the form that, despite the huge variances in 
the perception of institutional performance and the attitudes towards paying bribes, 
trust (adding the attachment of importance) in the institutions remains high 
throughout India. Likewise the voter turn outs in panchayat elections is consistently 
high throughout India.
19
 What does that mean? While trust measurements and 
election turn outs indicating consistent legitimacy of the PRI all over India, the 
perceptions of institutional performance and the measurement of attitudes towards 
bribes seem to deny this consistence. The first indicators suggest widespread 
acceptance and therefore legitimacy for the institution, according to Booth and 
Seligson (2009: 8) and Scully et al. (2004: 523). The variance in perception of 
performance and attitudes towards institutional channels conflicts with this 
consistency. While high performing PRI, where there is a mainly negative attitude 
towards bribes, should be consistent with high trust and election turn outs, low 
performing PRI with a less negative attitude towards bribes should enjoy low or no 
trust and election turn outs should be much lower (see the free rider problem; 
Ostrom 2000). Since the usage of institutional channels, the making of legal choices, 
and the performance of the institution, its efficiency are important legitimating 
factors (see Grafenstein 1989; Weatherford 1992), the high values on trust and 
election turn outs are contradictory to the low efficiency and positive attitude 
towards illegal choices in some PRI. So why do PRI then enjoy trust and why do 
citizens in their vast majority choose the institutional way of participation via 
elections?  
 
 
BRINGING THEORY BACK IN 
 
I will try to briefly apply the above mentioned question to the commonly accepted 
hypotheses of the standard theoretical discourse.  
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 I will omit the results on efficacy, since they are to ambiguous. 
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The bulk of literature (see Weber 1978 [1924]; Lipset 1959; Dowling and 
Pfeffer 1975; Meyer and Rowan 1991; Suchman 1995; Buchanan 2002; Levi et al. 
2009) suggests that internalised norms, values and beliefs are the main legitimating 
factors. These are constructed in the inter-subjective community, the common 
cultural context, through interrelations of the individuals. Being in congruence with 
these internalised norms, values and beliefs is the legitimacy of an institution. 
Applied on the PRI case that would mean that the PRI are legitimated because they 
are in congruence with the internalised norms, values and beliefs which are prevalent 
in their contexts. Reality suggests that this cannot be the case. Although being 
basically the same institution all over India, a developmental democratic grass-roots 
body, the cultural, social and economic contexts vary greatly. Trust and election turn 
outs are high in Muslim dominated states, like Jammu and Kashmir, in states with a 
decades long tradition of communist rule, like West Bengal, in economically 
advanced states like Gujarat, and in socially advanced states, like Kerala. To believe 
that all these greatly differing states have enough norms, values and beliefs in 
common to result in such a consistent picture would be naïve. That this hypothesis 
seemed applicable for the proposing theorists is due to the fact that they relied 
mostly on empirical data from coherent target groups. Most research in this area is 
conducted in European and U.S. American contexts or on little inter-subjective 
communities (see for example Powell and DiMaggio 1991). The approaches using 
procedural fairness (see Gibson 1995; Tyler 2006) have also a problem: As the only 
legitimating factor it is not sufficient. The proponents of procedural fairness work 
also with the internalisation of norms and values, seeing procedural fairness just as 
an additional factor. Further, empirical results, employing procedural fairness as a 
factor, are ambiguous at most (see p. 9).Coming to rational approaches (Grafenstein 
1989; Hall and Taylor 1996; Shepsle 2005) the problem is pretty obvious: 
Efficiency, that is the institutional performance, varies greatly and the willingness to 
abstain from illegal choices and to use only legal/ institutional channels varies 
greatly, too. At the same time, indicators of legitimacy are high (trust, election turn 
outs). That defies the rational argument of legitimacy through efficiency. As I 
already argued, trust should not be considered a legitimating factor (Levi et al. 2009) 
since the danger of establishing a tautological argument would arise.
20 
  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The paper has sought to present a picture of the prevalent research about institutional 
legitimacy and the problems which arise when such research is de-constructed 
against a developing country perspective, in this case the PRI in India. I neither 
claim completeness, nor do I want to comment on particular researchers and works 
only. My aim was to show what the research about institutional legitimacy has to 
offer and where they might go wrong or have sensible approaches. Further I did not 
intend to discuss the PRI as my particular object of research, nor do I claim any 
solutions for the presented puzzle. I simply wanted to illuminate the problems of the 
established legitimacy research by using the puzzle which can be observed when 
looking at the PRI case. 
 
My main critique on the various theoretical approaches would be their lack of 
evolution. Since the 1960s the research has not made any leaps, but only small steps 
at best. The assumptions of most of the research are deeply rooted in an 
understanding of political science as a 'liberal western' science in my opinion. 
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 I want to state clearly, that the arguments I make above can only be tentative with the data 
I use. However, the survey and election data do tend, in my opinion, strongly to contradict 
the prevailing hypotheses on legitimacy and legitimation. 
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Consequently most theories are aimed at liberal western contexts and their inter-
subjective communities, which is evident in the objects of investigation, which are 
normally institutions like the U.S. Congress, the U.S. Supreme Court or European 
bureaucracies. Especially in organisational studies, but generally in most theoretical 
approaches, the importance of the existence of inter-subjective communities is 
obvious. The accordance of institutions and their decisions with social norms and 
values in the processes of legitimation leave no room for interpretations of 
legitimacy apart from cultural and normative patterns. Sometimes the arguments 
made are even tautological or concepts of measurement mix with explanatory 
concepts. Simultaneously, pure rational concepts are not working either, since their 
pure output-benefit logic may not be always applicable. The globalisation of political 
science and the advent of the modern state outside the western context, however, 
produce challenges and provide phenomena which cannot be sufficiently explained 
by the common theoretical canon. Multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-lingual states 
like India, China or Indonesia may lie beyond them and their normative and cultural 
focus or cost-benefit analysis. This is explicitly shown by the case of the PRI. Their 
relatively high level of legitimacy, which is indicated by trust and voters turn outs in 
elections, somehow contradicts the results the PRI have produced. These can be 
regarded as 'mixed' at best. The few successes are often overshadowed by corruption 
and social exclusion. Again, the case study, a cross-survey analysis, is merely a way 
to illuminate the shortcomings of the prevalent academic discourse on legitimacy 
and not an explicit object of investigation! 
 
The discourse on legitimacy in political institutions and on the processes of 
legitimation must be brought into the context of the diverse world of the 21
st
 century. 
Researchers have to aim their approaches at the emerging democracies of Asia, 
Africa and South America. Political institutions in developing countries cannot be 
adequately analysed with hypotheses born in Western Europe during the early 
second half of the 20
th
 century: they need to be imagined afresh in the new contexts 
of time and space that mark the world we live in! 
 
  
Kai Fürstenberg 
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